state and federal appellate caseloads without much more substantial help from our clerks. (Coffin, 1994, p. 73) Over the past half century, concern has periodically erupted over the role that law clerks play in drafting U.S. Supreme Court opinions, sparked by suspicions that clerks wield too much influence and steer justices toward the left. In the 1950s, William Rehnquist, a former clerk and a future Chief Justice, characterized "the political cast of the clerks as a group" as "to the 'left' of either the nation or the Court" (Rehnquist, 1957, p. 75) . The ensuing controversy led conservative Senator John Stennis (D-MS) to call for Senate confirmation of clerks (Domnarski, 1996, p. 41) , for in Stennis's view clerkships were potentially "far more important than [the positions] occupied by undersecretaries and assistant secretaries of the Executive departments" ("Stennis Is Wary of Court's Clerks," 1958) .
1 Since then, this concern has hardly abated: In recent years, it has been charged that clerks, "dispatched by left-leaning law schools . . . with the mission of turning their justices into liberals," are responsible for the leftward shift of Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, and David Souter in recent abortion cases (Mauro, 1992) .
Most commentators believe that clerical influence has increased over time and bemoan the passing of judges like Learned Hand, whom they portray with "clipboard and pad, hand-writing opinions that are still literary oases in the vast deserts of our law libraries" (Frankel, 1994) . By contrast, today's justices are often viewed as editors, who delegate to their clerks the crucial task of writing the first opinion draft (Sanders, 1990) and thereby forfeit the chance to become a great judge (Posner, 1996, p. 149) . Relinquishing the drafter's pen, it is thought, lessens judges'sense of ownership of the opinions that bear their name (Kronman, 1993, p. 331) . In Frankel's (1994, p. 2) words, Everyone who has done serious writing knows the importance of the momentum of a first draft, the extent to which that draft becomes the final product. We all know, too, the inseparability of writing and thinking. Authors of the first draft do not simply put the judge's 'thoughts' into words; they substitute their own thoughts for the judge's and put them into the judge's mouth. This conventional view may be an oversimplification. For one thing, it assumes a stark historical contrast, with earlier generations of justices portrayed as single-handedly crafting their own opinions and with today's justices seen uniformly as leaning heavily on their clerks. Yet, as we will discuss below, historical accounts suggest that clerks have long played an active role in writing opinions, and recent accounts reveal wide differences in how modern justices have used their clerks. Unfortunately, systematic evidence is scant. To be sure, surveys of judges and clerks have probed the deployment of clerks (see, e.g., Crump, 1986; Domnarski, 1996; Oakley & Thompson, 1980; Sheldon, 1981) , but beyond establishing that clerks play a role in drafting opinions, such research has not even begun to estimate their contributions. Insofar as we are aware, only one such attempt has been made, and the author of that study, which focused on Thurgood Marshall's opinions in the 1990 term, conceded that it was "far too superficial to reach any definite conclusions about authorship" (Huber, 1991, p. 202) .
Our purpose here is to search for traces of clerical drafting-identifiable stylistic "fingerprints"-in the drafts of the opinions that two justices, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall, circulated during the 1985 term of the Court. To what extent did Powell and Marshall's opinion drafts bear the distinctive marks of their law clerks? Was one Powell or Marshall opinion draft essentially indistinguishable from another Powell or Marshall draft, or can these drafts be distinguished on the basis of the stylistic idiosyncrasies of the clerks to whom the primary responsibility for drafting was assigned? Given the differences in opinion-writing routines in Marshall and Powell's chambers, are there differences in the clerks' ability to craft opinions? This information would shed light on the principal-agent relationship between justices and their clerks.
In short, although our research cannot answer the question concerning the influence clerks wield in crafting the Court's legal policy, it does answer a prior question: To what extent is the involvement of clerks discernible in the language of Court opinions? If we can detect the individual styles of clerks in these opinions, we will have fulfilled an important necessary, but not sufficient, condition for establishing clerical influence on Supreme Court policy.
LAW CLERKS AS RESEARCH ASSISTANTS AND GHOSTWRITERS
Each justice on the Supreme Court is currently authorized to employ four law clerks, and the Chief Justice can hire one additional clerk. These clerks perform an array of duties. As outlined in the Law Clerk Handbook:
A law clerk is a lawyer employed to assist a judge with as many administrative, clerical, and basic legal tasks as possible, so as to leave the judge more time for judging and critical decision-making. . . . Clerks are usually assigned to do legal research, prepare bench memos, draft orders and opinions, edit and proofread the judge's orders and opinions, and verify citations. (Rubin & Bartell, 1989, p 
The conventional wisdom holds that this job description has evolved since the days when an earlier generation of Supreme Court justices drafted their own opinions. Justice Brandeis reputedly said that "the reason the public thinks so much of the Justices of the Supreme Court is that they are almost the only people in Washington who do their own work" (O'Brien, 1996, p. 142) . In Brandeis's day, clerks functioned principally as support staff, with an emphasis on conducting the justices' legal research.
3 This is not to say that clerks were mere research assistants, for many accounts show them serving as sounding boards for their justice (see Braden, 1953, p. 296) . Samuel Williston, who clerked for Justice Horace Gray in the late 19th century, noted that Gray frequently asked him to draft an opinion, but these drafts served as "a stimulus for the judge's own mind" (Williston, 1940, p. 92) . Although Williston recognized that "the ultimate destiny of such opinions was the waste-paper basket, [he proceeded on] the chance that some suggestion in them might be approved by the master and adopted by him" (Williston, 1909, p. 159) .
Contrary to long-standing impressions, clerks seem to have lent a hand in writing opinions for quite some time-sometimes by drafting opinions in "extremely unimportant" cases (Frank, 1972, p. 117) , but sometimes being assigned to draft more weighty opinions as well. For example, Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Murphy in the 1940s have been characterized as "absolutely dependent upon their law clerks for the production of their opinions" (Kurland, 1954, p. 299) . In fact, VinWahlbeck et al. / U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION DRAFTS 169 son is said to have written "with his hands in his pockets, outlining to his clerks generally what he wanted, and then criticizing this bit or that in a clerk's draft and making suggestions for revision" (Frank, 1972, p. 118) . Indeed, one of the most influential passages in a 20th-century Supreme Court opinion-footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products (1938) , which elevated the level of judicial scrutiny for the interests of "discrete and insular minorities"-was apparently written by a law clerk ("The Bright Young Men Behind the Bench," 1957, p. 48; Ely, 1980, p. 76) . According to Mason (1956, p. 513) , "The first draft of the second and third paragraphs of this historic note was written by Stone's law clerk, Louis Lusky. Stone 'adopted it almost as drafted,' Lusky has recalled, 'simply toning down a couple of over-emphatic words.' " In this case, the clerk not only drafted the language, but "originated" the underlying ideas as well (Mason, 1956, p. 513) .
The consensus among those who have commented publicly on the role of clerks in the federal courts seems to be that the practice of delegating opinion writing to clerks has become more common over the past several decades, perhaps as a consequence of increases in the federal courts' caseload (although with its discretionary docket, this applies with less force to the Supreme Court) and in the number of clerks allocated to each judge (Posner, 1996, p. 143) . Until 1886, justices had no clerks. 4 Then, in 1886, a single "stenographic clerk" was assigned to each justice (Newland, 1961, p. 301) , and that number ultimately reached four in 1978 (Posner, 1996, p. 139) . Of course, some justices have continued the routine of drafting their own opinions, as, for example, John Paul Stevens did (Eastland, 1989; Rosen, 1993) ; so did William O. Douglas, who wrote his drafts "in longhand-a kind of hieroglyphic taking considerable practice to decipher but which is written with the speed of shorthand" (Cohen, 1958, p. 6) .
5 Nevertheless, the prevailing image painted by judges and commentators alike is of justices who delegate the first draft of their opinions to their clerks (Frankel, 1994; Rehnquist, 1987) .
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LAW CLERKS AND JUSTICES MARSHALL AND POWELL
We focus here on two modern justices who relied on their clerks' assistance to a different extent. On one hand, Justice Powell was very 170 AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH / MARCH 2002 actively engaged in the drafting of opinions. Indeed, Powell is said to have exemplified the justice as micromanager (see Tushnet, 1992) . In contrast, Justice Marshall was a firm believer in delegating opinionwriting duties. On the Court, he continued to practice the management style he had acquired while litigating for the NAACP, running his chambers like a senior partner in a law firm "who sets the office's direction and motivates his or her subordinates to produce the very best work the office can" (Tushnet, 1992 (Tushnet, , p. 2111 .
Powell did delegate opinion writing to his clerks but exercised close supervisory control over the opinions. He once remarked that opinion drafts "go back and forth between me and the clerks like a shuttlecock," adding that "there were often as many as fifteen or twenty drafts before the product was ready to be sent to other members of the Court" (Totenberg, 1999, p. 605) . A former Powell clerk noted that Powell often required him to rewrite an opinion five or six times, and some opinions "required an even greater effort" before Powell was satisfied (Wilkinson, 1974, pp. 92-93) . The picture of Powell that emerges is of a justice who delegated the crafting of a first draft to one of his clerks but stayed actively involved in the writing process thereafter. According to one of his clerks, He did not simply take a clerk's draft and edit it into a final opinion. Rather, there was a sort of written dialogue between clerk and Justice. Typically, the clerk would write a first draft, to which Powell would respond with a memorandum proposing changes great and small: Add a paragraph on this or that, append a footnote on the following, cite this case, make that argument, and so on. The clerk would produce a revised draft, to which Powell would respond with another memorandum, and so on. If all went well, the memoranda got shorter as the opinion moved through successive drafts. . . . By this method, Powell kept several clerks busy on opinions that he in an important sense 'wrote,' even when he never put pen to paper. (Jeffries, 1994, p. 295) Powell's office manual describes these steps but adds other elements of complexity: After Powell and the principal clerk were satisfied with the opinion other law clerks reviewed it. The revised first draft is then given to a second clerk, who makes any stylistic or substantive changes that seem appropriate. After the Justice and the first clerk have reviewed those proposed changes the opinion is Wahlbeck et al. / U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION DRAFTS 171 sent to the print shop for a Chambers Draft. The Chambers Draft is then reviewed by the originating clerk, the Justice, and a third clerk. If time allows, everyone attempt [sic] to read the Chambers Draft and make [sic] suggestions, which by this time normally although not necessarily relate to matters of style rather than important substance. (Powell, 1975, pp. 5-6) As much as Powell was actively engaged in drafting opinions, Marshall seems to have been disengaged-a difference between the two justices embodied by Powell's incredulity on being told that "Marshall himself had spent maybe fifteen minutes to an hour going over the draft" dissent his clerk prepared in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) (Woodward & Armstrong, 1979, p. 306) . Indeed, Marshall's harshest critics claimed that he was more interested in watching television than the Court's proceedings (Eastland, 1989) . In fact, Eastland (1989, p. 24) points out that "close observers of the Court say that Marshall doesn't draft any of his own opinions and that he edits little, if at all." Other sources, friendlier to Marshall, sought to play down his disengagement from opinion writing. One former clerk noted that "Marshall relied more heavily on his law clerks for opinion writing than did the other Justices during the early years of his tenure, but his practices were not wildly out of line with those of the others on the Court" (Tushnet, 1992 (Tushnet, , p. 2112 . Similarly, Justice Brennan jumped to Marshall's defense, claiming that "if it appears in history books that Justice Marshall never did his own work, that would just be false" (Williams, 1998, p. 371) . One former clerk noted that Marshall's clerks usually wrote the first draft, "but then T. M. would go over it, and would talk with the clerks about it. He would talk about the draft opinions, what he liked, what he didn't like, he'd make editorial comments" (Williams, 1998, p. 370 ). Tushnet suggests that Marshall did not relinquish complete control over opinions. If a clerk produced a draft that Marshall found uncongenial to his own views, he would advise the clerk that two elements were missing, "point[ing] to his commission on the wall: 'Nomination by the president and confirmation by the Senate' " (Tushnet, 1996 (Tushnet, , p. 1147 .
These defenses of Marshall, although attempting to rebut the view of him as totally disengaged, certainly stop short of portraying him as having been as actively engaged in opinion writing as his colleagues were. Indeed, Huber (1991) reports that Marshall's opinions in the 1990 term displayed four distinct styles, which, presumably by no coincidence, was the same as the number of clerks he employed.
PRINCIPALS, AGENTS, AND MONITORING
Why do we consider the authorship of Supreme Court opinions a noteworthy research question? Our answer begins with the proposition that the legal rules articulated in the Court's opinion are the core of legal policy making (see Segal & Spaeth, 1993, p. 261) . These legal rules influence the behavior of private citizens and public officials alike by establishing expectations of appropriate behavior and the possibility of judicial sanctions for violations of these expectations (O. W. Holmes, 1897; Hurst, 1956; Spriggs, 1996) .
8 Given the importance of the rules contained in Court opinions, it becomes critical to understand who is writing them. After all, authorship has its privileges, and the rules expressed in opinions may be affected by whether the clerk or the justice has played the principal role in drafting. Indeed, some commentators assert that clerks, as novice attorneys, rely more extensively on multipart tests and balancing tests in the opinions they write (Kronman, 1993; Posner, 1996) .
What makes the role of law clerks even more interesting is that they and their justices are engaged in a classic principal-agent relationship. Justices, as principals, hire agents, their clerks, to perform particular tasks, such as writing first drafts of opinions. The clerks, however, often gain informational advantages over the justices regarding various aspects of cases. For instance, justices do not read most certiorari petitions but rather read the memoranda the clerks write summarizing the cases and making recommendations (see Rehnquist, 1987, pp. 264-265; Stevens, 1977) . What is more, as clerks research the facts and law relevant for a case, they can develop private information that would allow them to steer decisions in a particular direction. Consequently, it is possible that they can introduce language or develop legal reasoning that is not entirely consistent with the justices' positions, and the justice may be uncertain about whether the clerks are making choices that will produce outcomes desirable to them. One often-discussed solution to the principals'problem is to develop monitoring devices and incentive structures that will encourage agents to be faithful (see, for example, McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Moe, 1984) . As we discussed above, justices use different institutional rules, in the form of internal office procedures, that vary in the extent to which the justices (or other clerks) monitor the clerks'activities. We theoretically expect that these institutional rules influence the clerks' behavior, and thus clerks operating within tighter procedures will produce first drafts bearing less of their distinctive stylistic mark. Thus, given the differences in monitoring, we expect Marshall's clerks to exhibit greater signs of stylistic independence than Powell's clerks.
DATA AND METHODS
We selected the 1985 term of the Court for examination, one of the 15 in which Powell and Marshall served together on the Court. The 1985 term, Chief Justice Burger's last on the Court, was marked by a number of landmark decisions, including Batson v. Kentucky (1986) , which held that the Constitution prohibited prospective jurors from being struck on the basis of race, and Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) , in which the Court upheld Georgia's anti-sodomy law. In 1985, the Court continued its decades-long movement toward the right, deciding 37.8% of civil liberties cases liberally (see Epstein, Segal, Spaeth, & Walker, 1996, Table 3-8) . As a consequence, Marshall found himself in dissent in 32.7% of all cases that term, whereas Powell dissented in only 8.5% of the cases.
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During the 1985 term, Powell and Marshall each employed four clerks, although a clerk who was assigned to retired Justice Potter Stewart frequently assisted Powell's chambers. Justice Powell's case files indicate which of his clerks bore the primary responsibility for drafting each opinion. Justice Marshall's personal papers do not provide such information, but we were able to ascertain which clerk wrote the bench memo for every case, and ordinarily the same clerk would be assigned to draft the opinion to avoid having to spend time "familiariz[ing] himself with the law on the facts of the case" (Rehnquist, 1987, p. 298) .
11 If, however, such an assignment would produce a maldistribution of opinion-drafting responsibilities among 174 AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH / MARCH 2002 clerks, these assignments may have been reallocated in some instances. 12 Thus, our record of who had the drafting responsibility for a particular opinion was less secure for Marshall's clerks than for Powell's. We chose to analyze the draft of every opinion these two justices initially circulated to the conference. 13 Two aspects of this approach are noteworthy. First, we analyzed the first circulated draft rather than the final, published opinion on the assumption that distinctions among clerks might be somewhat more evident on the former than the latter. Second, we considered all opinions-majority, concurring, and dissenting. On the assumptions that the justices themselves would pay closer attention to their drafting on majority opinions and that majority opinions might be more formulaic in any event, we expected idiosyncrasies of clerical style to be less evident in majority opinions than in concurrences or dissents. Indeed, Justice Powell's office manual suggests as much:
Although all work for the Court is important, the substance and form of Court opinions have first priority with Justice Powell. His dissents and concurrences normally are not reviewed by as many persons as Court opinions, although these also must be well written. (Powell, 1975, p. 7) During the 1985 term of the Court, Powell "wrote" 39 opinions and Marshall, 42. We dropped 10 of these 81 opinions from consideration due to their brevity-each was less than 500 words long, and 1 (a Marshall dissent) contained only 54 words; for such small textual samples, the stylistic measures we used to compare drafts would be of questionable reliability. Moreover, Justice Powell's records indicated that he himself had drafted 2 opinions (both concurrences), so we dropped these from consideration as well, bringing the number of opinions in our working sample to 71, of which 35 were Powell's and 36 were Marshall's. Of the Powell opinions, 7 were drafted by C. Cabell Chinnis, 7 by Anne Coughlin, 6 by Michael Mosman, 11 by William Stuntz, and 4 by Robert Stack (Justice Stewart's clerk); of the Marshall opinions, we identified 13 as drafted by Rebecca Brown, 7 by Paul Mahoney, 8 by Daniel Richman, and 8 by Jonathan Weinberg.
To this point, our references to style have been broad and abstract, but to analyze stylistic differences in opinion drafts we obviously must operate on a much more specific and concrete level. In the field of staWahlbeck et al. / U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION DRAFTS 175 tistical stylisics, a vast array of different measures have been developed to do precisely that-to enable replicable comparisons of various aspects of written texts.
14 We adopted or adapted eight measures that seemed especially appropriate for our purposes, seven of which were based on calculations performed in LitStats 1.62 (Reimer, 1989) , a stylistic analysis program. The raw data for LitStats consisted of an ASCII version of each text. The program did nothing we could not have done by hand, but in fractions of seconds it performed calculations that otherwise would have taken thousands of hours. (The exception was the seventh measure, the number of footnotes in a text, which was readily ascertainable.) Most of these calculations produced simple counts of the frequencies with which various words appeared in a text, which were then converted into ratios; for example, the typetoken ratio and the relative frequency of once-words (both defined immediately below). Besides word-frequency counts, the program also calculated the mean length of the words and the sentences in a text and, where appropriate, the variability of these measures as well. The eight measures were as follows:
1. The type-token ratio. This is the number of different words in an opinion (types) as a percentage of the total number of words in the opinion (tokens). For example, the five-word sentence "The boy threw the ball" contains four different words (the appears twice), so the type-token ratio is 0.80. 2. Once-words. This is the relative frequency of words that appear exactly once in an opinion. For example, in the sentence "The boy threw the big ball and the big man hit it," the once-words ratio equals 0.778, because seven of the nine types in the sentence (boy, threw, ball, and, man, hit, and it) appear once; the type-token ratio for the same 12-word sentence is 0.75, because it contains 9 different words. Based on the close substantive connections between the respective pairs of measures, we expected these eight measures to tap four distinct dimensions concerning the style of Court opinions. Of these eight measures, the first two were obviously alternative indicators of the diversity or richness of the vocabulary in a given opinion; the next four related to two other dimensions, semantic complexity and variety, and syntactic complexity and variety; and the last two pertained to the richness of documentation in an opinion. Factor analysis of these eight measures yielded a clear-cut fourfactor fit, as anticipated, with the four factors jointly accounting for 90% of the variance in the eight measures, and with communalities (i.e., the proportion of variance in a given measure explained by the four-factor model) ranging from 0.79 to 0.99. The identities of the four factors and the values of the resulting factor scores remained essentially the same no matter which rotation we tried; whether assumptively or empirically, the four factors were orthogonal, a very convenient property for our subsequent analyses. Nor was it at all difficult to identify the factors, for, as expected, the factor matrix (i.e., the matrix of correlations between the factors and the eight measures) clearly established the existence of separate vocabulary variety, documentation, syntactic complexity and variety, and semantic complexity and variety factors.
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Considered jointly, the four factor scores for a given opinion draft located it in four-dimensional space. The issue of similarity or difference between drafts could then be understood as one of the spatial proximity or distance between them, the hypothesis being that opinions drafted by a particular clerk would be closer (i.e., more similar) to one another than to opinions drafted by another clerk. To test this hypothesis, we calculated the squared Euclidean distance in fourdimensional space between each pair of draft opinions, which numbered 2,485 in all. 17 As indicated in the appendix, these calculations were straightforward: We simply subtracted the factor score on one dimension for an opinion from the factor score on the same dimension for an opinion with which it was being compared, squared the differWahlbeck et al. / U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION DRAFTS 177 ence, and summed the squared differences across the four dimensions. Over the 2,485 pairs, the mean interopinion distance was 8.05, with wide dispersion, as indicated by the standard deviation of 6.77 and by the range, which extended all the way from 0.09 (for a pair of opinions that were almost identical on the four stylistic dimensions) to 42.07 (for a pair that were separated by a stylistic gulf).
DETECTING THE CLERKS' FINGERPRINTS
Rather than turning immediately to clerk-by-clerk comparisons, let us begin by briefly describing the 71 draft opinions. On average, these opinions contained 2.7 footnotes per 1,000 words, and footnoted material comprised 25% as many words as textual material. Justice Powell's clerks scored significantly higher on the documentation factor than did Justice Marshall's; that is, the former documented their draft opinions more lavishly than the latter. To a certain extent, this difference reflected the mix of opinions the two sets of clerks drafted. Among both Marshall's and Powell's clerks, majority opinions were most extensively footnoted and dissents least so, and Marshall's clerks drafted relatively fewer majority opinions and more dissents than Powell's. However, even when we held opinion type (concurring, dissenting, or majority) constant, the difference between Powell's clerks' opinions and Marshall's clerks' remained significant. So it appears that Powell's clerks did not heed the warning Powell issued in his memorandum to them on writing opinions, urging them to avoid the tendency "to lard opinions" with footnotes (Powell, 1984, p. 4) . No significant differences emerged on the vocabulary variety dimension between the opinions the two sets of clerks drafted, but there was a definite ordering on this dimension among types of opinions, with majority opinions scoring highest and concurrences lowest. Neither the identity of the justice nor the type of opinion mattered on the word length dimension, but opinions drafted by Marshall's clerks did outscore those drafted by Powell's clerks on the sentence length dimension, featuring sentences that were both longer and more variable in length; there were also differences on this dimension among majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, but the difference between the drafts prepared by Marshall's and Powell's clerks persisted when 178 AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH / MARCH 2002 these were taken into account. This finding seems to indicate that Powell's clerks heeded his admonition to "avoid long, compound and complex sentence structures" (Powell, 1984, p. 1) .
Some additional preliminary results may also be of interest. In the first place, the oft-noted difference in the drafting of opinions between the two justices' chambers-Powell's multiple-clerk review and Marshall's laissez-faire approach-led us to suspect that authorship might be more difficult to distinguish for opinions drafted by Powell's clerks than for those drafted by Marshall's clerks. That suspicion was borne out. Of the 118 pairs of Powell opinions drafted by the same clerk, the mean interopinion distance was 8.01. By contrast, the mean distance for Marshall opinions was 6.44 on the 155 same-clerk pairs. In other words, there was significantly greater intraclerk homogeneity among Marshall's clerks than among Powell's (F = 4.04, p < .05).
Less surprisingly, the majority opinion drafts that Powell and Marshall circulated were more uniform stylistically than were either their draft concurrences or dissents; the mean distance between pairs of majority opinion drafts was 5.83, as compared with 7.61 for pairs of concurrences and 8.63 for pairs of dissents.
18 This pattern is consistent with the impression that majority opinions tend to be relatively stylized and formulaic, concurrences and dissents more individualized and idiosyncratic. After all, majority opinions "routinely and boringly" recite case facts and procedural history as boilerplate (Posner, 1996, p. 351 ). Posner also complained that "many opinions are selfindulgent displays" (p. 351), and that separate opinions evidence "a deficient spirit of institutional responsibility" (p. 363). This follows Judge Frank Coffin's description of a dissenter's "feeling of unjudicial glee as one shucks off the normal restraints of writing for a panel and proceeds to thrust and parry with gay abandon" (Coffin, 1994, p. 227) .
One result is especially pertinent. Pairs of opinions drafted by the same clerk were most homogeneous stylistically and pairs of opinions drafted by clerks for different justices were least so (mean distances = 7.12 and 8.36, respectively, p < .05), with pairs of opinions drafted by different clerks for the same justice occupying the middle ground (7.70), significantly more homogeneous than different-justice pairs but not significantly less homogeneous than same-clerk pairs.
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This last set of results begins to speak to the hypothesis that opinions drafted by a particular clerk would have more in common with Wahlbeck et al. / U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION DRAFTS 179 one another than with opinions drafted by a different clerk. To provide a more refined test of this hypothesis, we defined a set of 45 dummy variables that identified the authors of each of the 2,485 pairs of opinions. For example, 2,464 pairs were scored 0 and 21 pairs were scored 1 on the variable that identified C. Cabell Chinnis as the author of both drafts in a pair, 2,436 pairs were scored 0 and 49 were scored 1 on the variable that paired Chinnis and Anne Coughlin as the authors of a pair of opinions, and so on. In light of the stylistic differences we had glimpsed among concurring, dissenting, and majority opinions, we also defined a set of dummy variables identifying the types of opinion involved in each pair (two majority opinions, two concurrences, two dissents, a majority opinion and a concurrence, a majority opinion and a dissent, or a concurrence and a dissent). Then we regressed the distance measure on 48 of the 49 author-pair dummies and five of the six opinion-type dummies, omitting one variable from each set to serve as the reference category.
Simply by identifying authors and opinion types, we were able to account for a significant proportion of the stylistic variation among the 2,485 pairs of opinions (adjusted R 2 = .12, F = 7.87, p < .05). Presentation of the full, 53-predictor set of regression results would be pointless (although these are found in the appendix), for many of the coefficients contained therein are not of interest in themselves. Rather, the key question is whether opinions drafted by a given clerk exhibited greater similarity to one another than to opinions drafted by a different clerk, holding constant the types of opinion in question. Based on the intercept and the unstandardized coefficients from the ordinary least squares regression model described above, we calculated the results that bear on that question, and present these results in Table 1 . Table 1 shows the estimated distances between pairs of draft opinions as a function of their authorship. These estimates are for pairs of majority opinions; every other opinion-type pairing produced significantly greater predicted distances (p < .05), confirming our expectation about the relative stylistic uniformity of majority opinions.
between Chinnis and Coughlin's drafts than between drafts by Chinnis himself. The italicized distance in each row (which is always for a same-clerk pairing) serves as the point of reference for gauging the statistical significance of the remaining distances in that row. Thus, the third entry in the first row gives the distance between two majority opinions, one drafted by Chinnis and the other by Michael Mosman (5.93)-and the difference between the Chinnis-Mosman pairing and the Chinnis-Chinnis pairing is again indicative of significantly greater stylistic similarity between drafts produced by the same clerk than between those produced by two different clerks.
Of the nine clerks, the ones who were most consistent stylistically from one draft opinion to another were Robert Stack (0.60), the Stewart clerk who assisted in Powell's chambers, and Daniel Richman (0.95), a Marshall clerk. At the other extreme were Anne Coughlin (9.11) and Michael Mosman (11.28), both clerks for Justice Powell, whose writing styles, as measured here, displayed little consistency from opinion to opinion.
The stylistic homogeneity of the opinions that Richman drafted significantly surpassed the similarity between Richman and six of the other eight clerks. Similarly, William Stuntz, although less stylistically uniform than Richman (5.46 vs. 0.95), also stood out clearly from five of his eight fellow clerks. Coughlin and Mosman, on the other hand, both drafted such stylistically heterogeneous opinions that neither passed our within-clerk versus between-clerks similarity test even once. More generally, the regression-based calculations summarized in Table 1 provided significant support (p < .05) in 23 of 64 clerical pairings, and near-significant support (.05 < p < .10) in another six such pairings, for the hypothesis that opinions drafted by a particular clerk would have more in common with one another than with opinions drafted by a different clerk.
CONCLUSION
What have we learned about the role that clerks play in drafting Supreme Court opinions? As expected, Powell's clerks displayed less autonomy than Marshall's. This finding reinforces the notion that institutional rules, including routines and procedures like the ones that Powell established in his chambers for drafting opinions, shape behavior (see Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck, 2000; March & Olsen, 1989 ). Powell may not have established his multiple-editor procedure with the intent of blunting his clerk's influence over his opinions, but this procedure had the measurable effect of blurring the fingerprints that individual clerks left on these opinions. In this sense, Powell's office procedures most likely reduced the principal-agent problem he faced with regard to his clerks. By closely monitoring their activity, Powell could be more confident that they were making choices consistent with his policy objectives.
By the same token, our findings bolster the view of Marshall as one who delegated the writing of opinions. What makes our findings concerning Marshall's clerks more remarkable is that we cannot be entirely certain which of his clerks actually drafted a given opinion. As noted above, Powell's case files recorded which clerk drafted each opinion, but Marshall's files contain no such information. In Marshall's case, we had to infer opinion authorship from bench memo 182 AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH / MARCH 2002 authorship, and these inferences may have missed the mark in some instances.
Does this necessarily mean that Marshall's clerks played the principal role in crafting the legal rules contained in his opinions? Any such conclusion would require a much greater inferential leap from our findings than it would be prudent to attempt. Moreover, a number of former clerks are on record contesting the idea that they influenced their justices'decisions. Rehnquist concluded that the opinions of Justice Jackson, for whom he clerked, "were unquestionably the Justice's own, both in form and substance" and that Jackson "neither needed nor used ghost writers" (Rehnquist, 1957, p. 74) . Frank concurs: "Even on those rare occasions when the clerk does the writing, the judge does the deciding. The ultimate matters of yes or no, affirm or reverse, the judges invariably keep in their own hands" (1972, p. 118) . This apparently has not changed in more recent years. According to one of Justice White's former clerks, in White's chambers a clerk's "euphoric dreams [of shaping the law] were generally short-livedterminating with the return of the draft bleeding with red ink from the Justice's pen, or more recently with the sound of the Justice's word processor as he worked on revisions to the draft" (Worthen, 1994, pp. 351-352) .
Because we have not addressed, let alone answered, the question of clerical influence on the substance of Supreme Court opinions, that question remains unsettled. A definitive answer to it will come slowly, if at all, for it will depend not only on reliable knowledge of a clerk's policy preferences but also on a counterfactual-what legal rule a justice would have adopted without the participation of a particular clerk in opinion drafting? We have established, though, as a precondition of substantive clerical influence, that stylistic traces of the drafting clerks can be found in Powell's and Marshall's opinions.
APPENDIX
This appendix details the factor analysis results, presents an example of how the scores for two opinions on the eight measures described in the text were turned into an interopinion distance score, and provides a full summary of the regression results.
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FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS
We obtained estimates of the initial factors via principal components analysis of the eight measures described in the text. A four-factor solution accounted for 90% of the variance in the eight measures, yielding eigenvalues above the conventional 1.0 threshold for each factor. A varimax rotation produced four orthogonal factors (although the obtained factors were orthogonal even with other rotations). The factor loading matrix for the rotated factors and the communality estimates are shown below: the former are the correlations between the measures and the factors; the latter give the percentage of variance in each measure accounted for by the four-factor solution. The clear factor loading pattern made it obvious that each factor captured a pair of stylistic measures, so we identified Factor 1 as vocabulary variety, Factor 2 as documentation, Factor 3 as semantic complexity and variety, and Factor 4 as syntactic complexity and variety. 
TRANSFORMING RAW SCORES INTO INTEROPINION DISTANCES
To illustrate how the eight original measures were transformed into interopinion distances, we use two specific opinions as examples: C. Cabell Chinnis's draft of Powell's dissent in California v. Ciraolo (1986) (hereafter Ciraolo) and William Stuntz's draft of Powell's majority opinion in Matsushita Electric Industrial v. Zenith Radio (1986) (hereafter Matsushita) . The scores of these two draft opinions on the eight measures described in the text are given in the first two columns below. We chose Chinnis's Ciraolo draft for this example because its score on each measure was close to the mean for all 71 opinions, as can be seen by considering the figures in the Ciraolo column in conjunction with the information contained in the mean and standard deviation columns. On several measures (most notably, the vocabulary diversity and the documentation measures), the scores for Stuntz's Matsushita draft were well above the mean; on one measure (average sentence length), Matsushita was well below the mean. Based on the factor loadings shown above, four new scores (one per factor) were generated for each opinion, each standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Inspection of the factor scores for Ciraolo and Matsushita, which are also shown below, should produce no surprises: they are high where they should be high, given the scores of the two opinions on the underlying measures, low where they should be low, and close to the mean where they should be close to the mean. Finally, to derive the stylistic difference ("distance") between Ciraolo and Matsushita, we simply subtracted one Factor 1 score from the other, squared the difference, repeated the process for the remaining factors, and summed the squared differences. Obviously, if the two cases had identical scores on the eight measures, the factor scores for the two cases would have been identical, and the difference between them would have been 0. As the table indicates, the average stylistic difference between a pair of opinions was 8.05, so the difference between Ciraolo and Matshshita of 3.34 is indicative of substantially greater than average stylistic similarity between those two draft opinions. 
REGRESSION RESULTS
The dependent variable in the regression model, which was estimated via ordinary least squares, was the distance between a pair of opinions. The predictors were (a) a set of dummy variables designating the pair of clerks involved in the opinion dyad and (b) another set of dummy variables designating the types of opinion involved in the opinion dyad. From the 45 possible pairings of nine clerks, one (the CC-CC pairing, designating a dyad consisting of two opinions drafted by C. Cabell Chinnis) was omitted to serve as the reference category. From the six possible pairings of opinion types, the M-M pairing, designating a dyad consisting of two majority opinions, served as the reference category. Accordingly, each unstandardized regression coefficient for Wahlbeck et al. / U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION DRAFTS 185 clerk pairings in the following table represents how much greater or smaller the estimated stylistic distance is, ceteris paribus, between two opinions drafted by a particular pair of clerks, relative to the distance between two opinions drafted by Chinnis. Similarly, each unstandardized coefficients for opinion-type pairings represent how much greater or smaller the estimated stylistic distances were, ceteris paribus, between two particular types of opinion, relative to the distance between two majority opinions. The distances given in Table 1 in the text were calculated directly from the coefficients in the following regression summary table. For example, in Table 1 the CC-CC distance of 2.61 (the estimated stylistic distance between two majority opinions drafted by Chinnis) is the sum of 0 (the implicit coefficient of the omitted clerk pairing, CC-CC), 0 (the implicit coefficient of the omitted opinion-type pairing, M-M), and 2.61, the constant in the regression model; the CC-AC distance of 7.02 (the estimated stylistic distance between one majority opinion drafted by Chinnis and another drafted by Anne Coughlin) is the sum of 4.41 (the coefficient of the CC-AC pairing), 0 (the implicit coefficient of the M-M opinion-type pairing), and 2.61, the constant; and the AC-MM distance of 9.43 (the estimated stylistic distance between one majority opinion drafted by Anne Coughlin and another drafted by Michael Mosman) is the sum of 6.82 (the coefficient for the AC-MM pairing), 0 (the implicit coefficient of the M-M opinion-type pairing), and 2.61, the constant. As indicated in the text, for each clerk pairing, statistical significance was determined twice, as the difference between the coefficient for the given pairing and each of the pertinent same-clerk pairings; thus, for example, the CC-AC distance of 7.02 was significantly greater than the CC-CC distance of 2.61, but obviously was not significantly greater than the AC-AC distance of 9.11. opinion in the case that contained the most bargaining among the justices (as defined by Maltzman et al., 2000) , and we discovered no stylistic differences. 14. Those unversed in statistical stylistics can familiarize themselves by browsing two principal publication outlets in this field, the journals Literary and Linguistic Computing and Computers and the Humanities. For a classic stylistic analysis of particular interest to political scientists, see Mosteller and Wallace (1984) . Numerous introductory treatments of stylistic analysis are available; see, for example, Burrows (1987) , Feldman and Norman (1987) , D. I. Holmes (1985) , or Potter (1989) .
15. Complications arise when, as in the present study, the type-token ratio or the once-words ratio is used to compare texts of different length. Because no one has an infinite vocabulary, the longer the text, the lower the measured vocabulary diversity as repetitions inevitably begin to occur. Accordingly, a number of different revised type-token ratios and once-words measures have been introduced to enable valid comparisons of texts of different sizes. Here we simply used logged terms in the denominators; that is, we calculated the type-token ratio as the number of types in an opinion divided by the log of the number of tokens, and the once-words ratio as the number of once-appearing words divided by the log of the number of types.
16. Additional information concerning the factor analysis is presented in the appendix, along with detailed descriptions of the calculation of interopinion distances and of the regression results.
17. Simple summation of the four squared dimensional distances for a given pair was possible due to the orthogonality of the dimensions.
18. The differences between majority opinions, on one hand, and concurrences and dissents, on the other, were both statistically significant (p < .05); the difference between concurrences and dissents was not.
19. Of the 2,485 pairs of draft opinions, 273 were written by the same clerk, 653 were written by different clerks for the same justice, and 1,559 were written by clerks for different justices. For example, by drafting 7 opinions, C. Cabell Chinnis, a clerk for Justice Powell, was responsible for 21 same-clerk opinion pairs. Anne Coughlin, another Powell clerk, also drafted 7 opinions, so the Chinnis-Coughlin dyad was responsible for 49 different-clerk-same-justice pairs. Because Rebecca Brown, a Marshall clerk, drafted 13 opinions, the Chinnis-Brown dyad accounted for 91 different-justice pairs.
20. For a pair of concurring opinions, 1.17 would be added to the distance estimates in Table  1 ; for a pair composed of one concurring and one majority opinion, 2.29; for a dissentingmajority pair, 2.86; for a concurring-dissenting pair, 3.02; and for a pair of dissenting opinions, 3.75.
